

9 September 1982

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Access to Telemetry ☐

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This note is "heads up" for a coming problem and offers you the opportunity to give me some guidance on this subject. ☐

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ACDA, in studying this issue so far, has asked for access to telemetry analysis information. The data they say they want are:

- relevant parameters we have and need in telemetry (and implicitly why, as well as how, we use such data);
- the impact on sources and methods of giving these parameters to the Soviets.

The idea is that this intimate information will be placed in policy review papers for the Executive Branch to decide how much access to telemetry, and other similar issues, is acceptable. In my view, only the Intelligence Community should make such judgments.

Moreover, while I am willing to share our most intimate details about sources and methods with ACDA officers, or anyone else, who has a need-to-know, I am opposed to a broad dissemination of this tender information throughout the policy community -- because, in general, such detailed information is only the business of the Intelligence Community. I don't.. believe the Intelligence Community should share the intimate details of telemetry collection, processing, or exploitation with the policy world any more than we do so for COMINT, imagery, or any other generic class of intelligence. And we do not, in general terms. ☐

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I hold these views very strongly because, in my view, some policymakers know too much information about sources and methods, and because some of them want to know more about our business than they know about U.S. weapons programs or diplomatic issues of comparable significance. In my view, this is in part because intelligence officers have wanted to be helpful and responsive -- even when the need-to-know principle was being grossly violated. ☐

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Acceding to ACDA's blanket requests for access to details, in my view, will lead in due course to more compromises about our telemetry capabilities and to policy agencies voting on how much, and what types of, telemetry data the U.S. should try to negotiate with the Soviets so that U.S. intelligence can monitor Soviet compliance. Both ideas are crazy as hell, in my view. ☐

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It might be a good idea for me to raise the issue formally in the SALT Monitoring Working Group. ☐

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There is a working group meeting today at 2:30 where this issue will be discussed. Unless I hear from you by around 2:00, my people will be instructed to take positions along these lines.

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If there is anything I can do for you here, please let me know.

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Chief,
Arms Control Intelligence Staff

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